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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Andrew Dallas Morgan appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon his guilty plea to 
grand theft. He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his 
motion to augment the record with transcripts from previous probation violation 
admission and disposition hearings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In February 2008, Andrew Morgan entered the rooms of two patients at 
the Life Care Center of Boise where he was formerly employed. (6/11/08 PSI, 
pp.2-3.) Morgan falsely identified himself as a close family friend of both 
patients. (Id.) Morgan removed, from the bodies of both patients, patches 
containing a high-dose prescription pain-relieving narcotic, Fentanyl, which had 
been affixed to the patients with a strong adhesive. (Id.) 
Upon noticing that the patches were missing, the Life Care Center 
conducted an internal investigation. (ld.) Several Life Care Center staff 
members reported that Morgan had visited with two patients whose pain patches 
were missing. (ld.) One of those patients reported that Morgan entered her 
room on two separate occasions and told her that he needed to remove her 
Fentanyl patch in order for her to avoid disease. (ld.) A patient sitter reported 
observing Morgan leaning over another patient who had just yelled out in pain. 
(Id.) 
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The Life Care Center put out security alerts and flyers with Morgan's 
photo and implemented new security procedures. (Id.) Morgan then returned to 
the facility and entered another patient's room. (Id.) The Life Care Center 
Executive Director confronted Morgan, who ran out of the building. (Id.) An Ada 
County detective subsequently made contact with Morgan, who admitted taking 
the pain patches from three Life Care Center patients to support his pain 
medication addiction. (Id.) 
The state charged Morgan with one count of burglary and three counts of 
grand theft. (R., pp.38-39.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Morgan pled guilty to 
one count of grand theft and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., 
pp.54-59.) In July 2008, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years with two years fixed, ordered Morgan to serve 120 days in the Ada County 
jail, and then suspended the balance of the sentence and placed Morgan on 
probation for seven years. (Id.) 
Approximately one year later, the state filed a report of probation violation 
alleging that Morgan violated his probation by failing to complete required 
treatment through the St. Alphonsus Addiction Recovery Program and Health 
and Welfare, failing to inform his probation officer that he had been terminated 
from his employment for failing to come to work, failing to inform his probation 
officer that he had been prescribed narcotics for his migraine headaches, and 
being charged with driving without a license and insurance. (R., pp.72-80.) 
Morgan admitted violating his probation, and the district court revoked probation 
but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-106.) At the conclusion of the period of 
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retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Morgan back on probation. (R., 
pp.109-113.) 
Less than a year later, the state filed a second report of probation 
violation, alleging that Morgan violated his probation by being removed from the 
Easter Seals treatment program due to poor attendance and violations of his 
behavior contract, failing to pay supervision fees and restitution, having contact 
with another probationer, and using medications contrary to the manner 
prescribed by his physician. (R., pp.127-133.) Morgan admitted violating his 
probation, and the district court revoked probation and imposed his original 
sentence. (R., pp.158-160.) 
Morgan filed a notice of appeal timely as to the second probation violation 
disposition order. (R., pp.155-157.) In his notice of appeal, Morgan requested 
the preparation of the entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R. 
25(c), which, in this case, included transcripts from Morgan's entry of plea and 
sentencing hearings. (ld.) He also requested transcripts of the admission and 
disposition hearings associated with his second probation violation. (ld.) The 
clerk's appellate record and requested transcripts were filed on September 30, 
2011. (9/30/11 Notice of Appeal Record Filed; see generally Tr.) 
On November 29, 2011, after requesting and receiving one extension of 
time to file his Appellant's brief (11/7/11 Order Granting Extension of Time), 
Morgan filed a motion to suspend the briefing schedule and to augment the 
appellate record with transcripts of the admission and disposition hearings 
associated with his first probation violation (11/29/11 Motion to Augment and to 
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Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof). The state 
filed an objection. (12/20/11 Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend 
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.") The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied Morgan's motion without comment and reset the due date for the 
filing of Morgan's Appellant's brief. (1112/12 Order Denying Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) 
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ISSUES 
Morgan states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Morgan due process 
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment 
with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Morgan's probation? 
(Appellant's brief, pA.) 
The state reph rases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Morgan failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record 
with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Morgan failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
by revoking his probation after his second probation violation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
Morgan contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with as-yet unprepared transcripts associated with his first probation 
violation, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection and has effectively denied him effective assistance 
of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) Morgan has failed to establish 
a violation of his constitutional rights, however, because he has failed to show 
that the requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for 
resolution of, the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Morgan Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
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proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. 
To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show 
that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. 
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) 
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also 
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice 
Morgan "must present something more than gross speculation that the 
transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th 
Cir. 2002). Morgan has failed to carry this burden. 
Morgan's appeal is timely only from the district court's August 3, 2011 
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence after his second 
probation violation. (See R., pp.158-160 (order revoking probation filed August 
3, 2011), pp.155-157 (notice of appeal filed August 2, 2011 ).) He has failed to 
explain, much less demonstrate, how transcripts of hearings associated with his 
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first probation violation are necessary to decide the only issues over which this 
Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. To the contrary, the record amply 
demonstrates that Morgan's motion to augment was properly denied because he 
failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for adequate 
review of the district courts' decisions to revoke Morgan's probation and order 
execution of his sentences. 
There is no evidence that the district court had such transcripts when it 
revoked Morgan's probation in August 2011, or that it relied upon anything said 
at the previous hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke Morgan's probation 
and order his sentence executed. Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts 
were never presented to the district court in relation to the second probation 
revocation proceedings, they were never part of the record before the district 
court in considering whether to revoke Morgan's probation and are not properly 
considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 
n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues 
raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the record made 
below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial 
court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 
1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and 
consider new evidence."). 
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Morgan 
(Appellant's brief, p.11), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into 
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execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons 
why Hanington does not support Morgan's claim of entitlement to the requested 
tra nscripts. 
First, unlike Hanington, Morgan does not challenge the sentence that was 
ordered into execution following his period of probation but argues only that the 
district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation (see Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-17), a decision that is capable of appellate review without resort to 
information bearing on the reasonableness of the sentence that was ultimately 
ordered into execution. 
Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the 
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and 
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate 
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the 
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was 
presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence 
in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date 
probation was finally revoked. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or 
all of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 
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("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 !daho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 
(indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was 
presented). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of 
probation, Morgan has failed to show, or even attempt to show, that any such 
circumstances apply here. Morgan has failed to point to anything in the record 
that would indicate that statements made at hearings associated with his first 
probation violation were considered or played any role in the court's decision in 
August 2011 to revoke Morgan's probation and order execution of the sentence 
after his second probation violation. As such, Morgan has failed to show that 
such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Morgan claims that 
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to 
complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.i 0.) He 
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and 
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the 
10 
state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or 
frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("The only way a court can 
constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript 
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) No 
reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kL. at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. kL. at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. kL. at 193. The Court noted it addressed a similar issue in 
Draper, 372 U.S. 487, where the Court held that the government need not 
provide transcripts that were not '''germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances. '" Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96). 
However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary 
to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the 
defendant with resources to pay his own way." kL. at 195. "Moreover, where the 
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete 
transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript 
or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds." kL. 
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Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. lit at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. lit at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the proceeding challenged on appeal is the revocation of Morgan's 
probation in August 2011. The record related to the district court's decision to 
revoke Morgan's probation and order execution of his sentence is already 
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before 
the appellate court. (See generally, 6/11/08 PSI, 7/5111 PSI, 7/18/11 APSI; R., 
pp.54-152; see generally Tr.) 
It is Morgan's appellate burden to establish that the requested transcripts 
are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the order 
revoking his probation. The augmentations he sought, however, were of never 
before prepared transcripts of hearings held months before the state filed its 
second report of probation violation. Nothing in the record even suggests that 
the requested transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district 
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court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings. Because Morgan failed 
to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested 
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before 
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate 
review, and Morgan has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 1 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Further, Morgan's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
due process rights lacks merit because Morgan was afforded the opportunity, 
prior to the settling of the appellate record, to designate not only the standard 
clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's 
record on appeal. I.A.R 28(a) and (c). In fact, Morgan took advantage of this 
opportunity to request, and receive, transcripts of his admission and disposition 
hearings associated with his second probation violation. (R, pp.155-157; see 
generally Tr.) Therefore, Morgan was provided the process by which he could 
designate all documents in the record he believed were necessary for appeal. 
While I.A.R 30 provides that a party may move the Idaho Supreme Court to add 
to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right to such augmentation. 
Morgan has failed to show that the ability to designate records for appellate 
review under I.A.R 28 was insufficient to afford due process in his case. 
1 As a component of his due process claim, Morgan argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) 
Because, for the reasons already explained, Morgan has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the 
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial 
of the motion to augment has deprived Morgan of effective assistance of counsel 
on this appeal. 
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Morgan has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. 
Morgan cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing, SLQ.,., 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record 
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Morgan's request 
for transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Morgan's motion would 
have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. 
The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a 
ground sufficient to jusJify the augmentation requested. I.A.R. 30. Morgan's 
motion to augment was denied because he failed to meet this minimal burden, 
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even 
helpful in addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order 
properly denied the motion to augment because Morgan failed to make a 
showing that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment 
the record as requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to 
augment would have been granted had Morgan been paying for the requested 
transcripts; the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Morgan has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
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record amply demonstrates that Morgan's motion to augment was properly 
denied because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were 
necessary for adequate review of the district court's decision to revoke Morgan's 
probation and order execution of his sentence. Because Morgan has failed to 
show his due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less 
violated, by the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis 
for relief. 
II. 
Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking His Probation After His Second Probation Violation 
A. Introduction 
Morgan contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking his 
probation, because, he claims, probation "was achieving its intended goal [of] 
rehabilitating a drug addict," and because his struggles with probation were a 
result of Morgan "attempting to balance his chronic pain with his addiction to 
prescription medication." (Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) None of Morgan's 
arguments establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district 
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105,233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525,529,20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
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C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Revoking Morgan's 
Probation 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325,834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053,1054,772 P.2d 260,261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325,834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558,758 P.2d at 717. 
At his second probation violation admission hearing, Morgan admitted to 
failing to complete treatment through the Easter Seals rehabilitation program. 
(Tr., p.48, L.7 - p.50, L.13.) Specifically, the presentence investigator reported: 
Heidi Garrett, Easter Seals Case Manager, was contacted 
via telephone. She reported that Mr. Morgan was difficult to treat 
and was not compliant. She relayed that he missed groups "weeks 
at a time" and claimed his absences were due to migraine 
headaches. While he consistently claimed he had suffered a back 
injury and also suffered migraine headaches, he never produced 
records from a physician to verify his claim. Ms. Garrett shared that 
Mr. Morgan was prescribed Norco 5 and told her that he took more 
than his prescribed dose, because his prescribed dose was not 
strong enough to address his pain. Ms. Garrett said Mr. Morgan 
was referred to physicians who could address his pain issues; 
however, he did not follow up with these referrals. She explained 
that Mr. Morgan was provided with every service available and he 
only had to stay clean, look for work, and participate in treatment in 
order to be successful. Instead, he took his medications as he 
wanted to, he attended groups when he wanted to, and he did not 
follow through with referrals. 
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(7/5/11 PSI, p.6; see also 7/5111 PSI attachments, "Case Management Client 
Progress Notes. ") Morgan also admitted to having contact with another criminal 
probationer in violation of his probation. (Tr., p.50, L.14 p.51, L.2.) 
At the second probation violation disposition hearing, the district court 
referenced Morgan's failure to take responsibility for his crime and history of not 
fully participating in required treatment: 
The PSI investigator said that she felt you didn't hold 
yourself responsible. I think that's about right. I think you hold 
everybody else responsible for a lot of the bad choices you are 
making. 
You don't follow through. You don't make your 
appointments. You make it impossible for probation to actually 
work, and then you suggest that you should continue on probation 
even though you don't do the most basic things of probation, which 
is make your appointments and follow through with what you are 
supposed to follow through with. 
(Tr., p.62, Ls.13-25.) 
The district court considered Morgan's recommendation that the court 
retain jurisdiction for a second time so that Morgan could participate in the CAPP 
rider program. (Tr., p.63, Ls.6-9.) However, the court ultimately concluded that 
the CAPP program was not "intensive enough for a person who is avoiding 
facing facts as much as [Morgan is]." (Id.) Instead, because the district court felt 
Morgan needed a "much longer term program," the court revoked probation, 
ordered the original sentence executed, and recommended the IDOC 
Therapeutic Community. (Tr., p.63, Ls.1-5.) 
That Morgan believes the district court should have reinstated his 
probation a second time does not establish an abuse of discretion. This is 
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particularly true where, as here, Morgan was given two opportunities to 
rehabilitate in the community, but continued to violate his probation. Because 
Morgan has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in revoking 
his probation and ordering his sentence executed, he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Morgan's probation 
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